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YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT: HOW WILL LAW
ENFORCEMENT GET WHAT IT NEEDS IN A POST-CALEA,
CYBERSECURITY-CENTRIC ENCRYPTION ERA?
Stephanie K. Pell*
In recent years, many technology companies have enabled
encryption by default in their products, thereby burdening law
enforcement efforts to intercept communications content or access
data stored on smartphones by traditional means. Even before
such encryption technologies were widely used, however, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) claimed its surveillance
capabilities were “Going Dark” due to the adoption by consumers
of new IP-based communication technologies, many of which are
not subject to any surveillance-enabling obligations under the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”).
The heightened tension produced by the introduction of encryption
by default into an environment where terrorism has magnified the
need for efficient law enforcement access (surveillance) supported
by a newly-expanded CALEA framework is often framed as a
contest between privacy and security. It is, however, more
accurately framed as a security issue on both sides, one side which
integrates traditional privacy concerns with the growing focus
upon cybersecurity equities (the “cybersecurity” argument) into a
critique of a second regime of “exceptional access” posited by law
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enforcement to sustain its access advantages either: (1) by
mandating that manufacturers insert “backdoors” into
applications, devices and communications networks; or (2) by
forcing companies, after-the-fact, to circumvent and undermine
security features they purposefully build into their products and
services. The cybersecurity and, incidentally, pro-privacy position
rejects exceptional access as a dangerous fiction that would,
among other things, create new attack surfaces, rendering
networks more vulnerable to every form of predation, from
financial crime and IP theft to cyber espionage, ultimately
generating unacceptable risks to our national and economic
security. The reconciliation of these competing visions of
security—of law enforcement’s traditional public safety mission
with cybersecurity—will require law enforcement to employ
investigative techniques that may include, among other things,
enhanced collection and exploitation of metadata, which is not
generally thwarted by the use of encryption technology. Although
many sources and forms of metadata are already available to law
enforcement, the widespread adoption of Internet of Things
(“IoT”) technology will generate additional forms of metadata,
potentially revealing sensitive information that would have been
difficult for the government to obtain in the past. Moreover, many
IoT devices include microphones and cameras that could be used
to eavesdrop remotely on targets, whether through direct hacking
or through law enforcement’s power to compel third parties to
facilitate such eavesdropping, thereby potentially mitigating
surveillance losses due to a target’s use of encrypted
communications.
This Article asserts that, for better or worse, law enforcement
has entered a new post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric investigative
era where the use of encryption and other security-enhancing
technologies is an irreversible fact and where getting a warrant or
court order will not, in and of itself, guarantee law enforcement
access to communications data. In this new surveillance era, law
enforcement will more often find itself forced to employ
individualized “collection” solutions for specific investigations,
rather than enjoy the ready-made access provided by a CALEAlike regime. That is, law enforcement will need, among other
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things, to target end-point devices, such as phones, computers and
IoT devices, rather than the surveillance mechanisms mandated by
a CALEA-like regime. As law enforcement seeks to employ old and
new kinds of investigative techniques that involve neither designing
access points into communications networks nor mandating
circumvention of security features in mobile devices—policy
choices necessary to support fundamental imperatives of
cybersecurity—policy makers will be forced to consider how to
facilitate, regulate, and oversee these law enforcement capabilities
and activities, balancing what law enforcement may need against
the social benefits of transparency and electronic privacy. The
current debate over law enforcement exceptional access is more
consistently divisive than not and, for the most part, not focused on
how to get law enforcement what it needs without undermining
fundamental principles of cybersecurity. A new dialogue on how to
get law enforcement what it actually needs in a Post-CALEA,
default-encryption era would be a much-needed step forward. That
journey forward, however, will require a return to some of the
historical debates about metadata collection and standards
governing law enforcement access to various kinds of new
revelatory metadata, such as that generated through the everexpanding IoT. Moreover, this journey will raise new legal,
ethical, and policy questions about when and if law enforcement
should be permitted to use IoT apertures for seeing and hearing
activities inside the home.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
It all started with a very small, unremarkable moment in time.
In July of 1999, a constable from the Warwickshire Constabulary
was awakened in the middle of the night and informed about a
package judged to be suspicious by an x-ray technician at Coventry
Airport in Coventry, England. 1 The package contained a .357
Magnum revolver hidden inside a child’s toy boat.2 In the coming
days and weeks, more packages containing weapons and
ammunition concealed inside children’s toys and hollowed-out
computer towers were discovered at Coventry airport, as well as
airports and post offices up and down the East Coast of the United
States, where they were intercepted en route to destinations
overseas.3 Agents noticed that the serial number on the revolver
from the first package had been filed down but forensic analysts
reconstructed the number, which allowed law enforcement to trace
the gun back to a dealer in South Florida and, subsequently, to a
woman who had purchased it there.4 Moreover, the first group of
packages discovered at the Coventry airport was mailed from
South Florida via Express Mail, which allowed agents to identify
the locations, times, and dates on which each package was mailed.5
Cameras inside those post offices recorded video showing two men
mailing the first package containing the .357 Magnum.6
A comprehensive, labor-intensive investigation ensued. 7
Federal agents obtained and reviewed express mail mailing
records, driver’s license records, financial records, and forms
1

This factual scenario is taken from a real case prosecuted by the author of this
Article in 1999–2000. United States v. Claxton, No. 99-06176 (S.D. Fla. June 13,
2000) (Ferguson, J.). For more information about the case, see Mike Clary, Lax
Florida Laws Attracted IRA, REGISTER-GUARD, June 8, 2000, at 6A,
https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=ilNWAAAAIBAJ&sjid=hOsDAAAAIB
AJ&pg=6729%2C2038072.
2
United States v. Claxton, supra note 1.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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documenting the purchase of firearms. 8 They also conducted
physical surveillance by car and on foot, executed search warrants
on places where the defendants lived, and performed various kinds
of forensic analysis, among other investigative techniques, that
notably did not involve the interception of communications
content. 9 These efforts identified four individuals who were
arrested, then indicted on various terrorism and gun smuggling
charges. 10 Ultimately, the investigation revealed these defendants
were part of a cell of Irish Republican Army (“IRA”) operatives
who came to the United States, purchased weapons illegally, hid
them in children’s toys and hollowed-out computer towers, and
mailed them to the Republic of Ireland, where they were to be
smuggled into Belfast.11 This operation continued unabated during
a critical time in the peace process. The weapons were intended to
replace surreptitiously the cache of weapons being publicly turned
over as part of the Good Friday Agreements. 12 The “Troubles”13
found their way to South Florida, and it took an exhaustive effort
by FBI Miami’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, working with agents
in other parts of the country and with foreign partners, to identify
the individuals involved in and, ultimately, to disrupt this gunrunning operation.14
This condensed factual narrative describing a case the author of
this article investigated and prosecuted only sixteen years ago, in
1999–2000, is a useful historical template for analysis of some of
the critical discourse about current law enforcement investigative
capabilities. The IRA case, a pre-September 11th terrorism
investigation, occurred before the advent and ubiquitous adoption
8

Id.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See The Troubles, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles (“The
Troubles refers to a violent thirty year conflict framed by a civil rights march in
Londonderry on 5 October 1968 and the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April
1998. At the heart of the conflict lay the constitutional status of Northern
Ireland.”).
14
See United States v. Claxton, supra note 1.
9
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of smart phones, thus none of the rich metadata and tracking
capabilities currently provided by modern mobile devices was
available to the IRA case investigators. Indeed, while some of the
IRA defendants were discovered to have had cell phones, these
phones were not useful sources of information during the course of
the investigation.15 In fact, no phone conversations or other forms
of communications content were ever intercepted by law
enforcement. 16 On the day agents planned to arrest all of the
defendants, for example, one defendant evaded law enforcement’s
physical surveillance of him and drove all the way from South
Florida to Philadelphia, where he was later located and arrested
without the aid of location data produced by a cellular phone.17 The
most useful oral statements by any defendant did not come as a
result of wiretaps, but through a Mirandized confession of the lead
defendant, Conor Claxton, who told agents that this was a
Provisional Irish Republican Army operation, that the peace
process was not working, and that the weapons were meant to kill
British police and Protestant paramilitary forces.18
One current heated public discussion pertaining to law
enforcement’s allegedly waning surveillance capabilities is
generally referred to as the “Going Dark” debate, one aspect of
which is commonly alluded to as the current “Crypto Wars.” This
debate springs from claims by high-level law enforcement
officials, including the FBI Director19 and the Manhattan District
15

Id.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See generally Statement of James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Before the House Judiciary Committee Hearing Encryption
Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy, FBI, (Mar. 1, 2016),
available
at
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/encryption-tightropebalancing-americans-security-and-privacy (“When changes in technology hinder
law enforcement’s ability to exercise investigative tools and follow critical leads
we may not be able to root out the child predators hiding in the shadows of the
Internet or find and arrest violent criminals who are targeting our
neighborhoods. We may not be able to identify and stop terrorists who are using
social media to recruit, plan, and execute an attack in our country. We may not
16
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Attorney,20 that law enforcement no longer has sufficient access to
evidence and information necessary to fulfill its traditional public
safety mission including, among other things, preventing terrorist
attacks, locating kidnapped children, and apprehending pedophiles.
The basis of this claim stems primarily from three recent burdens
placed upon law enforcement’s access to communications data: (1)
the default encryption of smartphone data using technology that
prevents the phone manufacturer from being able to access it and
turn it over to law enforcement, even in response to a warrant;21 (2)
the protection of voice, video, and text communications with endto-end encryption where communication service providers do not
have access to the encryption keys, thereby preventing them and,
consequently, law enforcement from getting access to unencrypted
communications; 22 and (3) the consumer adoption of IP-based
communications services that, while not employing end-to-end
encryption, nevertheless do not fall under the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act’s (“CALEA”) 23 mandate
requiring service providers to provision their networks in a way
that will enable law enforcement wiretapping capabilities (without
be able to recover critical information from a device that belongs to a victim
who cannot provide us with the password especially when time is of the essence.
These are not just theoretical concerns.”). Id.
20
See generally REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY, (Nov. 2015) [hereinafter
Manhattan DA report]. “Apple’s and Google’s decisions to enable full-disk
encryption by default on smartphones means that law enforcement officials can
no longer access evidence of crimes stored on smartphones, even though the
officials have a search warrant issued by a neutral judge. Id. at i (emphasis in
original).
21
Id.; see infra discussion Part II.
22
See infra discussion Part II.
23
47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006). CALEA was enacted “to ensure that law
enforcement surveillance capabilities remained intact during the move from a
copper-wire phone system to digital networks.” Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad,
Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 421
(2012). CALEA did not, however, require a telecommunications carrier to be
capable of decrypting communications that were encrypted by a subscriber or
customer unless the carrier “provided the encryption” and “possessed the
information necessary to decrypt the communication.” 47 U.S.C. §1002(b)(3).
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such purposeful provisioning, communications data may not be
available to law enforcement).24
While federal law enforcement agencies have not proposed
new, specific legislative language to mandate access to new
communications technologies,25 they have called for companies to
create “backdoors”26 that will provide law enforcement access to
24

See infra discussion Part II. Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Chairman Tom Wheeler discussed the need to expand CALEA when it was
believed that Islamic State perpetrators of the Paris terrorist attacks
communicated using the Playstation 3 video game chat function (an IP-based
communications service not covered by CALEA’s wiretapping mandate). Brian
Fung and Andrea Peterson, FCC Chairman Suggests Expanded Wiretap Laws in
Response to the Paris Attacks, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2015), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/11/17/the-fccsuggests-expanded-wiretap-laws-in-response-to-the-paris-attacks/.
25
As of the writing of this Article, the Administration has indicated that it
would not seek legislation to require companies to provide access to encrypted
communications, although the FBI Director continues to “pres[s] companies for
special government access.” Nicole Perloth and David E. Sanger, Obama Won’t
Seek
Access
to
Encrypted
Data,
Oct.
10,
2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/us/politics/obama-wont-seek-access-toencrypted-user-data.html. Senators Feinstein and Burr have, however, released a
discussion draft of a bill, called the “Compliance With Court Orders Act of
2016, that would require companies to render unintelligible data intelligible. See
Andy Greenberg, The Senate’s Draft Encryption Bill is Ludicrous, Dangerous,
Technically
Illiterate,
WIRED
(April
8,
2016),
http://www.wired.com/2016/04/senates-draft-encryption-bill-privacy-nightmare/
(“[T]he bill would make illegal the sort of user-controlled encryption that’s in
every modern iPhone, in all billion devices that run Whatsapp’s messaging
service, and in dozens of other tech products. ‘This basically outlaws end-to-end
encryption,’ says Joseph Lorenzo Hall, chief technologist at the Center for
Democracy and Technology. ‘It’s effectively the most anti-crypto bill of all anticrypto bills.’”). Id. See also Riana Pfekkerkorn, Here’s What the Burr-Feinstein
Anti-Crypto Bill Gets Wrong, JUST SECURITY (April 15, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/30606/burr-feinstein-crypto-bill-terrible/. For an
explanation of end-to-end encryption, see infra note 27.
26
See David Kravets, FBI Chief Tells Senate Committee We’re Doomed
Without
Crypto
Backdoors,
Ars
Technica
(Jul.
8,
2015)
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/07/fbi-chief-tells-senate-committeewere-doomed-without-crypto-backdoors/ (“James Comey, the director of the
FBI, told a Senate committee Wednesday that the government should have the
right to lawfully access any device or electronic form of communication with a
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this information, including data “in motion” that is encrypted endto-end.27 The problem with this “request” and any legal mandate
that might develop from it is that there are no “one way” backdoors
available exclusively to law enforcement. Indeed, security experts
warn that this notion of law enforcement “exceptional access” is a
dangerous fiction that threatens to undermine our national and
economic security. 28 As Professor Matt Blaze, cryptographer,
computer scientist, and security researcher explained in written
testimony prepared for a congressional hearing on encryption
technology and possible policy responses:
At first blush, a “lawful access only” mechanism that could be
incorporated into the communications systems used by criminal
suspects might seem like an ideal technical solution to a difficult policy
problem. Unfortunately, harsh technical realities make such an ideal
solution effectively impossible, and attempts to mandate one would do
enormous harm to the security and reliability of our nation’s
infrastructure, the future of our innovation economy, and our national
security.29
lawful court order, even if it is encrypted. Comey and another Justice
Department official briefed the Senate Judiciary Committee and complained that
keys necessary to decrypt communications and electronic devices often reside
‘solely in the hands of the end user’—which they said is emblematic of the socalled ‘Going Dark problem.’ Companies should bake encryption backdoors into
their products to allow lawful access, they said.”).
27
End-to-end encryption can be generally described as “a method to secure
data while in flight from one device to another . . . [and] loosely define[d] as a
method to protect data in flight over a network such that only each end of the
transaction has the ability to see the plaintext.” Branden Williams, WILL END TO
END ENCRYPTION SAVE US ALL?,
3
(2010),
available
at
https://www.brandenwilliams.com/brwpubs/WillEndtoEndEncryptionSaveUsAll
.pdf.
28
See Steven Bellovin, The Danger of Exceptional Access, CNN OPINION
(Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/18/opinions/bellovin-encryptiondebate/(“It would be nice if we could safely and effectively change our
cryptography to let us spy on the bad guys. Unfortunately, we can’t. So if we
insist on systems that allow exceptional access, we end up weakening our own
security without enhancing our ability to monitor them. And in the process, we
may just make it easier for terrorists to exploit weakened cryptosystems -- and
do us more harm in the process.”).
29
Encryption Technology and Potential U.S. Policy Responses: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Infor. Tech. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
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Reform, 114th Cong. 3-4 (2015) (written testimony of Professor Matt Blaze)
https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/encryption-technology-and-potential-u-spolicy-responses/ [hereinafter Blaze]; see also, HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., KEYS
UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING INSECURITY BY REQUIRING GOVERNMENT
ACCESS TO ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS
1–3
(2015),
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/ 97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015026.pdf (“As computer scientists with extensive security and systems
experience, we believe that law enforcement has failed to account for the risks
inherent in exceptional access systems . . . . There are three general problems.
First, providing exceptional access to communications would force a U-turn
from the best practices now being deployed to make the Internet more secure.
These practices include forward secrecy — where decryption keys are deleted
immediately after use, so that stealing the encryption key used by a
communications server would not compromise earlier or later communications.
A related technique, authenticated encryption, uses the same temporary key to
guarantee confidentiality and to verify that the message has not been forged or
tampered with. Second, building in exceptional access would substantially
increase system complexity. Security researchers inside and outside government
agree that complexity is the enemy of security — every new feature can interact
with others to create vulnerabilities. To achieve widespread exceptional access,
new technology features would have to be deployed and tested with literally
hundreds of thousands of developers all around the world. This is a far more
complex environment than the electronic surveillance now deployed in
telecommunications and Internet access services, which tend to use similar
technologies and are more likely to have the resources to manage vulnerabilities
that may arise from new features. Features to permit law enforcement
exceptional access across a wide range of Internet and mobile computing
applications could be particularly problematic because their typical use would be
surreptitious — making security testing difficult and less effective. Third,
exceptional access would create concentrated targets that could attract bad
actors. Security credentials that unlock the data would have to be retained by the
platform provider, law enforcement agencies, or some other trusted third party.
If law enforcement’s keys guaranteed access to everything, an attacker who
gained access to these keys would enjoy the same privilege. Moreover, law
enforcement’s stated need for rapid access to data would make it impractical to
store keys offline or split keys among multiple keyholders, as security engineers
would normally do with extremely high-value credentials. Recent attacks on the
United States Government Office of Personnel Management (OPM) show how
much harm can arise when many organizations rely on a single institution that
itself has security vulnerabilities. In the case of OPM, numerous federal
agencies lost sensitive data because OPM had insecure infrastructure. If service
providers implement exceptional access requirements incorrectly, the security of
all of their users will be at risk.”)
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As part of the analysis supporting this assertion, Professor
Blaze explains that modern digital systems are extremely
vulnerable because computer science “does not know how to build
complex, large-scale software that has reliably correct behavior.”30
He goes on to describe the observed effects of increasing
complexity in software systems upon their relative security:
The number of software defects in a system typically increases at a rate
far greater than the amount of code added to it. So adding new features
to a system that makes it twice as large generally has the effect of
making it far more than twice as vulnerable. This is because each new
software component or feature operates not just in isolation, but
potentially interacts with everything else in the system, sometimes in
unexpected ways that can be exploited. Therefore, smaller and simpler
systems are almost always more secure and reliable, and best practices
in security favor systems [with] the most limited functionality possible.
The goal is to minimize the “attack surface” 31 that any software
vulnerabilities would expose.32

A backdoor, a general term describing a mechanism or access
point in a communications device or network that enables “the
creator of software or hardware [to] access data without the
permission or knowledge of the user,”33 creates an additional attack
surface.34 Specifically, code must be written to create the backdoor
and the code must have unfettered access to communications
content.35 The additional code creates the potential for more bugs
(more code, more bugs) that could be exploited to allow improper
access to the system.36 Moreover, for a backdoor in an encrypted
30

Blaze, supra note 29, at 2.
For more about “attack surfaces,” see Pravetz, infra note 34.
32
Blaze, supra note 29, at 3.
33
Swire & Ahmad, supra note 23, at 460.
34
Jim Pravetz, What’s An Attack Surface?, THE ZERO TOUCH BLOG (Feb. 23,
2013), http://www.armor5.com/blog/2013/what-is-attack-surface/ (“In the world
of computer security, the term attack surface refers to the depth of methods a
hacker can use to exploit your system.”).
35
Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian (Mar. 28, 2016). For more
information about Dr. Soghoian’s background see https://www.dubfire.net/.
36
See Blaze, supra note 29, at 3. See also Chad Perrin, The Danger of
Complexity: More Code, More Bugs, IT SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/the-danger-of-complexity-morecode-more-bugs/3076 (“If you want to produce secure software you should
31
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communications service to offer interception functionality, the
service provider must have momentary access to the unencrypted
communications data.37 As a result, if and when security flaws in
the system are discovered and exploited, the worst-case scenario
will be unauthorized access to users’ communications.38 In other
words, when compromised, an encrypted communications system
with a lawful interception backdoor is far more likely to result in
the catastrophic loss of communications confidentiality than a
system that includes no capability allowing deliberate access to the
unencrypted communications of its users.39
The recent high-profile dispute between Apple and the FBI
over the FBI’s inability to access data on an iPhone used by one of
focus on following the advice. All else being equal if you can find a way to
eliminate lines of code without compromising the proper functioning of the
software you will probably improve the security of the software substantially.”).
37
Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian, (Mar. 28, 2016).
38
Id.; see also Storing Passwords, or The Risk of a No-Salt Diet,
TECH@FTC (Mar. 21, 2013), http://techatftc.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/
storing-passwords-or-the-risk-of-a-no-salt-diet/. When discussing best practices
for storing and protecting passwords, security researcher Dr. Steven Bellovin
begins with a fundamental security principle: “It’s a prime rule of security:
something that doesn’t exist can’t be stolen. Conversely, if something does exist,
it can be stolen or leaked in many, many ways.” Id. This principle is applicable
to law enforcement backdoors as well: If they exist, they will be discovered and
exploited; see also Bellovin, supra note 28.
39
Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian, (Mar. 28, 2016). Researchers
Micah Sheer, Eric Cronin, Sandy Clark, and Matt Blaze have done research
illustrating ways to exploit wiretapping technology. See Signaling
Vulnerabilities in Wiretapping Systems (Nov. 2005), http://www.computer.org/
csdl/mags/sp/2005/ 06/j6013-abs.html. Moreover, information revealing U.S.
government targets of interception in the possession of third parties can prove to
be an irresistible target for China. See Matthew J. Swartz, Google Aurora Hack
Was Chinese Counterespionage Operation. Information Week Dark Reading
(May 21, 2013) http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/googleaurora-hack-was-chinese-counterespionage-operation/d/d-id/1110060. (“Former
government officials with knowledge of the breach said attackers successfully
accessed a database that flagged Gmail accounts marked for court-ordered
wiretaps. Such information would have given attackers insight into active
investigations being conducted by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies
that involved undercover Chinese operatives.”). Id.
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the San Bernardino shooters 40 has further elevated and exposed
tensions between the FBI and Silicon Valley over the decision, by
some companies, to include strong encryption and other
cybersecurity technologies in their products.41 At issue is the fact
that, starting with iOS 8, Apple’s mobile devices encrypt user data,
by default, with a key that is inaccessible to Apple. 42 Earlier
versions of Apple’s operating system had encrypted the data with a
key that remained accessible to Apple and, as a result, the
company could extract data from seized devices for law
40

See In the Matter of the Search of An Apple iPhone Seized During the
Execution of a Search Warrant on A Black Lexus IS300, California License
Plate 35KGD203; Government’s Ex Parte Application For Order Compelling
Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search; Memorandum of Points and Authorities;
Declaration of Christopher Pluhar; Exhibit (Feb. 16, 2016) (Central District of
California ED No. 15-0451M) (hereinafter “Government’s Ex Parte Application
For Order Compelling Apple”). At the time the government filed this Motion to
Compel Apple’s assistance to unlock the iPhone, the government claimed that it
was unable to access the encrypted content on the phone and that “Apple has the
exclusive technical means which would assist the government in completing its
search but has declined to provide that assistance voluntarily.” Id. at 3. Since
that time, third party professional hackers have assisted the government with
getting access to the encrypted data on the phone, see infra note 52. See Kevin
Johnson, Jon Swartz and Marco della Cava, FBI Hack’s Into Terrorist’s iPhone
Without Apple, USA Today (Mar. 29, 2016) http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2016/03/28/apple-justice-department-farook/82354040/. The
government has, therefore, requested that the original order compelling Apple’s
assistance be vacated. See In the Matter of the Search of An Apple iPhone Seized
During the Execution of a Search Warrant on A Black Lexus IS300, California
License Plate 35KGD203; Government’s Status Report (Mar. 18, 2016).
41
In reaction to this high-profile case, the House Judiciary Committee held a
hearing to examine the matter (witnesses included the FBI Director, Apple’s
General Counsel and the Manhattan DA); see https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/
the-encryption-tightrope-balancing-americans-security-and-privacy/.
More
colloquially, John Oliver presented a recent satiric piece on the FBI vs. Apple fight;
see John Oliver, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Encryption (HBO), LAST
WEEK TONIGHT, (Mar. 13, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsjZ2r9Ygzw.
42
See Apple’s Process Guidelines at 9, US Law Enforcement (“For all devices
running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple will not perform iOS data extractions
as data extraction tools are no longer effective. The files to be extracted are
protected by an encryption key that is tied to the user’s passcode, which Apple
does not possess.”). Id. at 9.

612

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 599

enforcement.43 In the case involving an iPhone 5C used by one of
the deceased San Bernardino shooters, the FBI—via the All Writs
Act44—sought to compel Apple to write and sign new code (a new
operating system) that would disable two security features
purposely engineered by Apple to protect data stored on a phone.45
These features prevent “brute force” attempts to break a usercreated passcode by “[c]yber-attackers intent on gaining
unauthorized access to a device . . . if given enough chances to
guess and the ability to test passwords rapidly by automated
means.”46 Specifically, “Apple imposes escalating time delays after
the entry of each invalid passcode” and a setting, “if activated,”
that “automatically deletes encrypted data after ten consecutive
incorrect attempts to enter the passcode.”47
While some have accused the FBI of trying to compel Apple to
produce a backdoor for law enforcement, 48 using backdoor in a
metaphorical sense not as a term of art, from a technical
perspective it would be more accurate to say that the FBI is trying
43

Id.; see also Government’s Ex Parte Application For Order Compelling
Apple, supra note 40, at 3–4.
44
28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (2012). (“The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all s necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”).
45
See Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple, supra
note 40, at 4–8.
46
Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist
Agents in Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel
Assistance [hereinafter Apple’s Motion to Vacate Order] at 6, In re the Matter of
the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant
on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 150451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016.).
47
Id.
48
Apple characterizes the new operating system that the government attempts
to compel it to create as “effectively a ‘back door’” Id. at 2. Security Researcher
Jeffrey I. Schiller has also suggested that “[i]n some ways, Apple’s Signing key
is a backdoor, in that it can be used to subvert the security of the iPhone. At this
point Apple probably understands this as well. Fortunately, there are ways to
close this particular backdoor. One simple way is to require that a phone be
unlocked in order to install a software update.” See Jeffrey I. Schiller, It’s About
Security, not Privacy, https://jis.qyv.name/home/pages/20160226 (last visited
May 1, 2016).
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to compel Apple to write code that exploits an existing
vulnerability in the Apple iPhone 5C.49 That is, iPhones will run
code that Apple has signed, regardless of whether that code is
“good code” that protects the security of the system, or “bad code”
that intentionally weakens the security of the system.50 The dangers
of compelling the construction in communications networks of
actual technical backdoors, which Professors Matt Blaze, Steve
Bellovin, and others warn us all about, should not be conflated
with what the FBI has attempted to compel Apple to do in the San
Bernardino case. As the public and policy makers attempt to
grapple with these very difficult and complex issues, such lexical
confusion risks undermining the strong, powerful security
arguments made against any compelled backdoor access. There
should be an equally strong preference, therefore, for employing
the term backdoor only in its precise technical sense when
discussing the security of IP-based communications.
There are, however, legitimate security questions and concerns
surrounding the FBI’s demand in the San Bernardino case—but
they should be framed accurately. While a full discussion of the
particular security risks at issue is beyond the scope of this Article,
two important policy considerations should be considered. First, as
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issues guidance strongly
encouraging companies to use encryption to protect sensitive
consumer information, 51 we should question concurrent
49

Interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian (Mar. 28, 2016).
Id.
51
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Start with Security: A Guide for
Business (June 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/
start-security-guide-business (“Use strong cryptography to secure confidential
material during storage and transmission. The method will depend on the types
of information your business collects, how you collect it, and how you process
it.”). Moreover, when a company promises strong encryption to its customers,
the FTC expects delivery of strong encryption. See FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, Dental Practice Software Provider Settles FTC Charges It Misled
Customers
About
Encryption
of
Patient
Data
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/dental-practicesoftware-provider-settles-ftc-charges-it-misled (“‘Strong encryption is critical
for companies dealing with sensitive health information,’ said Jessica Rich,
50
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governmental actions that undermine the encryption and security
features companies would purposely build into their products
according to that guidance. Indeed, it is a bit incoherent for one
arm of the government to encourage companies to develop and
deploy the most secure, state of the art practices to secure customer
data while another attempts to compel a company to undermine
these very same practices. What equities does our government
really want to protect here, and how are they to be promoted
through its policies?
Second, while the San Bernardino case was resolved because
the FBI bought an exploit from third party professional hackers52
that allowed them to access the data on the phone,53 the FBI and
DOJ’s proposed use of the All Writs Act to attempt to compel
Apple to write code and sign that undermines core security features
built into the iPhone raises the question of what other kinds of
actions a company could be compelled to do in order to assist with
the execution of a court order.54 While each new kind of compelled
action would be a legal question for courts to consider, security
experts are concerned about the kind of precedent such an

Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. ‘If a company promises
strong encryption, it should deliver it.’”).
52
See Ellen Nakashima & Adam Goldman, No Links to Foreign Terrorists
Found on San Bernardino iPhone So Far, Officials Say, THE WASHINGTON
POST (April 14, 2016), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/no-links-to-foreign-terrorists-found-on-san-bernardino-iphone-sofar-officials-say/2016/04/14/f1aa52ce-0276-11e6-9203-7b8670959b88_story.html
(“Last month, a third party — professional hackers who hunt software flaws to
sell — demonstrated to the bureau a method for unlocking the Apple iPhone of
Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the shooters in the attack that killed 14 people.”).
53
See generally supra note 40 and accompanying text.
54
Apple raises this concern in its Motion to Vacate Order. See Apple’s
Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 46, at 4, when it suggests that “if Apple can
be forced to write code in this case to bypass security features and create new
accessibility, what is to stop the government from demanding that Apple write
code to turn on the microphone in aid of government surveillance, activate the
video camera, surreptitiously record conversations, or turn on location services
to track the phone’s user? Nothing.”
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expansive reading of the All Writs Act could set.55 For example,
could the DOJ obtain a court order compelling companies to sign
and deliver surveillance software though existing automatic update
mechanisms? 56 Technologist Dr. Christopher Soghoian raises a
significant cybersecurity harm that could flow from such
compelled action:
If consumers fear that the software updates they receive from
technology companies might secretly contain surveillance software
from the FBI, many of them are likely to disable those automatic
updates. And even if you aren’t worried about the FBI spying on you, if
enough other people are, you will still face increased threats from
hackers, identity thieves and foreign governments.
There are a lot of parallels between computer security and public
health, and in many ways, software updates are like immunizations for
our computers. Just as we want parents to get their children immunized,
we want computers to receive regular software updates. Indeed, just as
the decision by some parents to not vaccinate their children puts their
entire community a at risk, so too the decision to turn off automatic
updates not only impacts the individual, but other users and
organizations, as those vulnerable, infected users’ computers will be
used by hackers to target others.57

To be clear, the prior technical discussion of backdoors and the
broader security questions at issue in the San Bernardino case is
summary in nature, relying on the analyses and opinions of
respected researchers in the computer science and security
community and policy makers at the FTC. Drawing on this
expertise and the conclusion that backdoors created for “good
guys” can and will also be exploited by “bad guys,” this Article
begins with the premise that mandating the creation of backdoors
in our communications networks and mobile devices is not a viable
option for solving issues related to law enforcement access to
communications data in an IP-based communications

55

See Christopher Soghoian, The Technology at the Heart of the Apple-FBI
Debate, Explained, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/02/29/thetechnology-at-the-heart-of-the-apple-fbi-debate-explained.
56
See id.
57
Id.

616

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 599

environment. 58 Moreover, this Article operates from the premise
that we need to question and understand the broader security
implications of an expansive reading of the All Writs Act, whether
in the San Bernardino case or any other case where the government
is attempting to compel a company to take actions that undermine
the security of its networks, services, and products.
This Article does not, however, discount the fact that law
enforcement faces certain challenges in an environment where it
may no longer be able either to obtain access to data stored on a
cell phone 59 or to intercept plain text communications content
though traditional methods—i.e. getting a warrant. Indeed, in some
circumstances, law enforcement may never have access to relevant
data, or at least not in time to assist with an investigation. For
better or worse, due to the mandates of CALEA and earlier
smartphone technical architectures that allowed companies to
bypass a user’s password and provide data to the police, law
enforcement became accustomed to an environment where the
technical capabilities for gaining access to information were
generally in place and easily available.60 But that environment is
changing and, without some new kind of CALEA-like mandate,
58

Consistent with opinions expressed by computer scientists cited in this
Article, security researcher Bruce Schneier succinctly explains the technical
realities and consequences of any “exceptional access” scheme, whether
providing access to encrypted data or not:
As technologists, we can’t build an access system that only works for
people of a certain citizenship, or with a particular morality, or only in
the presence of a specified legal document. If the FBI can eavesdrop on
your text messages or get at your computer’s hard drive, so can other
governments. So can criminals. So can terrorists. This is not
theoretical; again and again, backdoor accesses built for one purpose
have been surreptitiously used for another. Vodafone built backdoor
access into Greece’s cell phone network for the Greek government; it
was used against the Greek government in 2004-2005. Google kept a
database of backdoor accesses provided to the U.S. government under
CALEA; the Chinese breached that database in 2009.
Bruce Schneier, Security or Surveillance, LAWFARE (Feb. 1, 2016 1:01 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/security-or-surveillance.
59
See Statement of James Comey, supra note 19.
60
See infra Part II.
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which seems unlikely in the near future,61 law enforcement will be
forced to adapt in different ways. How it will and should adapt is a
critical discussion that law enforcement, policy makers, and the
public must have.
The rhetoric surrounding the “Going Dark” debate or the
current “Crypto War” has often been more divisive than
productive62 and, for the most part, not directed at identifying and
obtaining what law enforcement actually needs, rather than what it
wants ideally, in the current technological environment.63 Indeed,
61

It is impossible to predict the future. As of the writing of this article, the
Administration has indicated it is not proposing legislation to mandate law
enforcement access to communications content. Two senators have released a
discussion draft of a bill that would, however, mandate law enforcement access
to communications content, even when communications are encrypted end-toend. This discussion draft is receiving significant criticism from the security
community. See generally supra note 25; see also, Steven Bellovin, Problems
with the Burr-Feinstein Bill SMBlog - STEVE BELLOVIN’S BLOG,
https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/blog/control/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
62
FBI Director James Comey has, for example, claimed that Apple and
Google allow people to place themselves beyond the law:
The notion that we would market devices that would allow someone to
place themselves beyond the law, troubles me a lot. As a country, I
don’t know why we would want to put people beyond the law. That is,
sell cars with trunks that couldn’t ever be opened by law enforcement
with a court order, or sell an apartment that could never be entered
even by law enforcement. Would you want to live in that
neighborhood? This is a similar concern. The notion that people have
devices, again, that with court orders, based on a showing of probable
cause in a case involving kidnapping or child exploitation or terrorism,
we could never open that phone? My sense is that we’ve gone too far
when we’ve gone there.
See Kashmir Hill, FBI Director Says Apple and Google Are Putting Their
Customers ‘Beyond the Law’ FORBES (Oct. 13, 2014, 9:17 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/13/fbi-director-says-appleand-google-are-putting-their-customers-beyond-the-law/#589474aa81cf.
63
A report, Don’t Panic: Making Progress on the “Going Dark” Debate, THE
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY (2016)
[hereinafter Don’t Panic], is a noted exception to this statement. Another
important exception is Steve Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark and Susan
Landau’s companion articles, Going Bright: Wiretapping without Weakening
Communications Infrastructure, 14 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 62 (2013) and
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some of the rhetoric used by government officials in the current
“Crypto War” has, at times, framed the debate primarily as a
privacy issue, at best minimizing, at worst obfuscating the serious
cybersecurity risks at stake.64 A more constructive dialogue should
Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet,
12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2014).
64
See Devlin Bartlett, “FBI Chief: Pendulum on Privacy ‘Has Swung too
Far,” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 16, 2014) http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2014/10/16/fbi-chief-pendulum-on-privacy-has-swung-too-far/ (“The head of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation urged Silicon Valley Thursday to reverse
course on encrypting phone data, suggesting the pendulum on privacy issues
‘has swung too far’ against the government in the wake of revelations by former
National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.”) Id. More recently,
statements about the dispute between the FBI and Apple over access to
encrypted data stored on the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone by FBI Director
Comey and Apple CEO Tim Cook illustrate their different perspectives on the
role encryption plays in society and its affect on public safety and security and
the rule of law:
FBI Director James Comey put this new predicament starkly in a
congressional hearing on the San Bernardino case in February. “Law
enforcement, which I’m part of, really does save people’s lives, rescue
kids, rescue neighborhoods from terrorists,” he said. “And we do that a
whole lot through court orders that are search warrants. And we do it a
whole lot through search warrants of mobile devices. So we’re gonna
move to a world where that is not possible anymore? The world will
not end, but it will be a different world than where we are today and
where we were in 2014.”
Comey, who declined to be interviewed on this subject, has framed the
conflict as a choice between privacy and security, a zero-sum trade-off.
If it were that simple, Apple would have a steep battle indeed:
whatever benefits we get from encryption would have to be weighed
against the possibility of lives lost to acts of terrorism. But Cook flatly
rejects this view as a red herring. “I think it’s very simplistic and
incorrect,” he says. “Because the reality is, let’s say you just pulled
encryption. Let’s you and I ban it tomorrow. And so we sit in Congress
and we say, Thou shalt not have encryption. What happens then? Well,
I would argue that the bad guys will use encryption from nonAmerican companies, because they’re pretty smart, and Apple doesn’t
own encryption.
Lev Grossman, Inside Apple CEO Tim Cook’s Fight With the FBI, Time (Mar.
17, 2016) http://time.com/4262480/tim-cook-apple-fbi-2/.
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recognize the competing visions of security at issue—that is, when
strong cybersecurity practices and the critical equities they help to
protect65 may be at odds with certain aspects of law enforcement’s
traditional public safety mission.66 Understanding and responding
to the full scope and nature of law enforcement’s challenges in the
current technological environment is a complex inquiry and
analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, any
such comprehensive, nuanced analysis will require more
information, gathered over time, from law enforcement
investigations.
This Article attempts, however, to assist in focusing this
analysis by examining how the ever-expanding Internet of Things
(“IoT”) 67 could give law enforcement at least some of what it
needs, both with respect to increasing the availability of revelatory
metadata and providing new, less problematic apertures for the
65

“Each terrorist attack grabs headlines but the insidious theft of U.S
intellectual property – software business plans, designs for airplanes
automobiles pharmaceuticals etc. – by other nations does not. The latter is the
real national-security threat and a strong reason for national policy to favor
ubiquitous use of encryption.” Susan Landau, The National Security Needs for
Ubiquitous Encryption, Appendix A, Don’t Panic, supra note 63.
66
See Grossman, supra note 64; see also, Bruce Schneier, Security or
Surveillance, Appendix A, Don’t Panic, supra note 63 (“As framed in the media
encryption debates are about whether law enforcement should have access to
data or whether companies should be allowed to provide strong encryption to
their customers. It’s a myopic framing that focuses only on one threat –
criminals including domestic terrorists – and the demands of law enforcement
and national intelligence. This obscures the most important aspects of the
encryption issue the security it provides against a much wider variety of threats.
Encryption secures our data and communications against eavesdroppers like
criminals, foreign governments, and terrorists. We use it every day to hide our
cell phone conversations from eavesdroppers and to hide our Internet purchasing
from credit card thieves Dissidents in China and many other countries use it to
avoid arrest. It’s a vital tool for journalists to communicate with their sources for
NGOs to protect their work in repressive countries and for attorneys to
communicate with their clients.”) Id.
67
The IoT, as used in this article, “refers to the ability of everyday objects to
connect to the Internet and to send and receive data” Federal Trade Commission,
Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World, (Jan. 2015), FTC
IoT Staff Report at i, [hereinafter FTC IoT Staff Report].
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interception of communications content. Part of the method of
examination will be a re-envisioning of what certain aspects of the
1999 IRA investigation described at the beginning of this Article
might look like when recontextualized in 2016. Taking this
investigation forward in time imaginatively will allow for a
discussion of how capabilities in the current technological
environment might aid or hamper that investigation and
prosecution, giving some perspective on: (1) the types of
investigative capabilities law enforcement gains and loses in a
metadata-rich, post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption
environment; (2) how such gains and losses can affect an
investigation; and (3) how, notwithstanding the revelatory nature
of some kinds of metadata and metadata analysis, metadata cannot
always be a substitute for communications content in an
investigation and prosecution.
Taking the IRA case forward in time will not illustrate every
kind of investigative challenge facing law enforcement in the
current technological environment. Rather, it is a vehicle to
facilitate a productive dialogue about what law enforcement
actually needs in a post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption
environment. This discussion will, however, ultimately lead to
some of the same privacy-focused debates about the appropriate
scope of metadata collection and appropriate standards governing
law enforcement access to metadata. It will also raise privacy
questions about law enforcement use of IoT apertures to hear and
see activities going on inside the home.
Part II of this Article examines the “Going Dark” and current
“Crypto War” debate as, at least in part, a resource issue, which, in
turn, illustrates the need for a concerted focus on determining what
law enforcement actually needs in a post-CALEA, cybersecuritycentric encryption environment. Part III describes aspects of the
IoT for purposes of understanding how it could aid law
enforcement investigations. Part IV then examines how the IRA
investigation described at the beginning of this Article might
unfold in the current technological environment, with a particular
focus on the IoT. Part V provides a brief conclusion.
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II.

THE CURRENT “CRYPTO WAR” AND “GOING DARK”
DEBATE
Part II examines one key issue affecting the “Going Dark”
debate—a resource issue that was identified even before many
Silicon Valley firms started to encrypt user data by default. This
discussion not only leads to a critique of the “Going Dark”
metaphor itself, but also suggests the need for a focused dialogue
to determine what law enforcement actually needs in a postCALEA,
cybersecurity-centric
encryption
environment.
Accordingly, this Part ends by raising questions about how to
evaluate what law enforcement needs in the current technological
environment.
In early 2011, approximately three years before Apple kicked
off the latest battle in the Crypto Wars with its expansion of
encryption on iOS, then FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni
testified at a House Judiciary Committee hearing entitled Going
Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New
Technologies.68 Using the “Going Dark” metaphor, she explained
the interception challenges facing law enforcement in a
technological environment devoid of the wiretapping capabilities
envisioned by CALEA:
In the ever-changing world of modern communications
technologies . . . the FBI and other government agencies are facing a
potentially widening gap between our legal authority to intercept
electronic communications pursuant to court order and our practical
ability to actually intercept those communications . . . . We call this
capabilities gap the “Going Dark” problem. As the gap between
authority and capability widens, the government is increasingly unable
to collect valuable evidence in cases ranging from child exploitation
and pornography to organized crime and drug trafficking to terrorism
and espionage—evidence that a court has authorized the government to
collect. This gap poses a growing threat to public safety . . . . [D]ue to
68

Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New
Technologies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
[hereinafter Going Dark Hearing] (statement of Valerie Caproni, General
Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://judiciary.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/Caproni02172011.pdf.
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the revolutionary expansion of communications technology in recent
years, the government finds that it is rapidly losing ground in its ability
to execute court orders with respect to Internet-based communications
that are not covered by CALEA. This gap poses a growing threat to
public safety . . . . [D]ue to the revolutionary expansion of
communications technology in recent years, the government finds that
it is rapidly losing ground in its ability to execute court orders with
respect to Internet-based communications that are not covered by
CALEA.69

Notably, this segment from Caproni’s 2011 written statement
does not address wiretapping problems due to encryption, but
rather, the loss of capabilities due to consumer use of new IP-based
communication services that are not covered by CALEA’s
wiretapping mandate. In her oral testimony, Caproni does,
however, describe an environment where law enforcement
wiretapping capabilities could be unduly hampered by encryption,
requiring labor intensive, individualized solutions that could
overwhelm law enforcement resources:
There will always be criminals, terrorists, and spies who use very
sophisticated means of communications that are going to create very
specific problems for law enforcement. We understand that there are
times when you need to design an individual solution for an individual
target . . . . We are looking for a better solution for most of our targets,
and the reality is, I think, sometimes we want to think that criminals are
a lot smarter than they really are. Criminals tend to be some-what lazy,
and a lot of times, they will resort to what is easy. And, so long as we
have a solution that will get us the bulk of our targets, the bulk of
criminals, the bulk of terrorists, the bulk of spies, we will be ahead of
the game. We can’t have individual—have to design individualized
solutions as though they were a very sophisticated target who was selfencrypting and putting a very difficult encryption algorithm on for
every target we confront because not every target is using such
sophisticated communications.70

A year before Caproni testified, Google turned on HTTPS for
Gmail, kick-starting a growing trend by tech companies enabling
transport encryption by default. 71 A year later, Apple upped the
69

Id. at 1.
Id. at 52.
71
See Ryan Singel, Google Turns on Gmail Encryption to Protect Wi-Fi
Users, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2010, 2:25 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/01/google70
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ante by deploying end-to-end encryption in iMessage and
FaceTime apps, thereby preventing the company from decrypting
the communications content because it does not have access to the
keys.72 Apple also took steps to secure data stored on its mobile
products by enabling disk encryption by default in its iOS
operating system. Initially, this process used a key that was
accessible to the company but, since 2014, the key encrypting data
must be derived from the user’s password, rendering these data
inaccessible to the firm.73 More specifically, while earlier versions
turns-on-gmail-encryption-to-protect-wi-fi-users/ (Gmail users will now default
to HTTPS as communications travel between Google’s servers and a user’s
computer. Google’s prior default was to use HTTPS only for log-in, not for
entire email sessions. While this switch does not encrypt the email, it prevents
simple sniffing by hackers over insecure Wi-Fi connections). Id. While Google’s
use of HTTPS is arguably the start of a trend, the use of HTTPS does not
significantly frustrate law enforcement surveillance because emails sent by
Gmail users, at least for now, remain unencrypted while they sit stationary on
Google’s servers. Google has access to the stored email messages and generally
can provide them to law enforcement when served with a warrant. More
specifically, because Gmail’s website uses HTTPS encryption, data sent
between Gmail users and Google is encrypted as it travels between the user and
Google’s servers. As such, that data cannot be intercepted by law enforcement in
“real time” with the assistance of a wiretap order served on a broadband ISP or
telecommunications carrier. Law enforcement can, however, access the stored
communications by compelling to Google to produce them with a court order.
72
See John Evering, Push for a More Secure Digital Privacy Irreversible
After Edward Snowden Leaks, THE NATIONAL (Feb. 11, 2015)
http://www.thenational.ae/business/technology/push-for-a-more-secure-digitalprivacy-irreversible-after-edward-snowden-leaks. For an explanation of end-toend encryption, see supra note 25. With respect to iMessage text messages,
however, such messages are backed up by default, without encryption, to
Apple’s iCloud service. Accordingly, unless the user disables the backup
function, the text messages remain available to law enforcement with the
appropriate court order, generally a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak,
631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
73
See generally supra notes 40–50 and accompanying text. See also Matthew
Green,
Why
Can’t
Apple
Decrypt
Your
iPhone,
CRYPTOGRAPHYENGINEERING.COM
(Oct.
4,
2014),
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/10/why-cant-apple-decrypt-youriphone.html. Green notes:
What’s happened in the latest update is that Apple has decided to
protect much more of the interesting data on the device under the
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of iOS used encryption with a key not known to Apple for some
data, iOS 8 expanded the use of this encryption to more kinds of
user data—such as photos and text messages—that are generally of
interest to law enforcement.74 Google has also stated that it intends
to encrypt its Android operating system by default, but the firm
and its hardware partners have encountered technical issues
resulting in most Android phones still remaining unencrypted. 75
More recently WhatsApp, a popular messaging service owned by
Facebook and used by a billion people, now uses end-to-end
encryption by default, and other firms such as SnapChat and
Google are reported to be working on similar enhancements to
their own services.76
user’s passcode. This includes photos and text messages -- things that
were not previously passcode-protected, and which police very much
want access to . . . . Previous versions of iOS also encrypted these
records, but the encryption key was not derived from the user’s
passcode. This meant that (provided one could bypass the actual
passcode entry phase, something Apple probably does have the ability
to do via a custom boot image), the device could decrypt this data
without any need to crack a password.
Id.

74

Id.
See Andrew Cunningham, Android 6.0 Re-implements Mandatory Storage
Encryption for New Devices, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 19, 2015, 3:53 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/10/android-6-0-re-implements-mandatorydevice-encryption-for-new-devices; interview with Dr. Christopher Soghoian
(April 14, 2016).
76
See Danny Yadron, Facebook, Google and WhatsApp Plan to Increase
Encryption of User Data, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2016, 6:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/14/facebook-googlewhatsapp-plan-increase-encryption-fbi-apple; see also Cade Metz, Forget Apple
vs. the FBI: WhatsApp Just Switched on Encryption for a Billion People, WIRED
(Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbi-whatsappjust-switched-encryption-billion-people/ (“[T]oday, the enigmatic founders of
WhatsApp, Brian Acton and Jan Koum, together with a high-minded coder and
cryptographer who goes by the pseudonym Moxie Marlinspike, revealed that the
company has added end-to-end encryption to every form of communication on
its service. This means that if any group of people uses the latest version of
WhatsApp—whether that group spans two people or ten—the service will
encrypt all messages, phone calls, photos, and videos moving among them. And
that’s true on any phone that runs the app, from iPhones to Android phones to
75
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For law enforcement, encryption that is enabled by default that
also places keys solely in the hands of device holders significantly
disrupts traditional forms of surveillance that have relied on third
parties’ (telecommunications providers and ISPs) having access to
communications content, at least in most circumstances. As
Caproni alludes to in her 2011 congressional testimony, without
such third party access, law enforcement must find individualized
investigative solutions. 77 In other words, time, energy, and
resources must be expended to determine how to acquire data
about a specific target that would otherwise readily be available
from third parties with an appropriate court order without all these
additional transaction costs. Caproni explains that, while law
enforcement efforts can accommodate some of these
individualized investigative necessities, an environment where
encryption by default was the rule rather than the exception poses a
potential financial and human resource burden that threatens
significant harm to law enforcement’s ability to pursue and fulfill
its public safety mission.78
While it is certainly fair to recognize the changing investigative
environment for law enforcement and the burden it places on law
enforcement resources, the Berkman Center Report questions the
very accuracy of the “Going Dark” metaphor itself.79 The authors
assert that “[s]hort of a form of government intervention in
technology that appears contemplated by no one outside of the
most despotic regimes, communication channels resistant to
surveillance will always exist.” 80 The Berkman Report broadly
concludes that “communications in the future will neither be
Windows phones to old school Nokia flip phones. With end-to-end encryption in
place, not even WhatsApp’s employees can read the data that’s sent across its
network. In other words, WhatsApp has no way of complying with a court order
demanding access to the content of any message, phone call, photo, or video
traveling through its service. Like Apple, WhatsApp is, in practice, stonewalling
the federal government, but it’s doing so on a larger front—one that spans
roughly a billion devices.”). Id.
77
See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
78
See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
79
See Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 9–15.
80
See id. at 2.
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eclipsed into darkness nor illuminated without shadow.” 81 The
report then offers several findings to support the thesis that, despite
the recent developments in the employment of encryption by
default in consumer communication products,” law enforcement is
not “Going Dark.”82 Two of these findings have particular import
on how the IoT, as part of the current technological environment,
gives law enforcement at least some of what it needs. Specifically,
the IoT and its ever-expanding networked sensors may provide
platforms and apertures for viewing activities and recording
communications content.83 Moreover, the IoT adds to the metadatarich investigative environment available to law enforcement.
Because most metadata is difficult to encrypt and is likely to
remain unencrypted for the foreseeable future, it will continue to
enhance law enforcement capabilities.84
These two observations about the IoT raise broader questions
about how metadata and communications content function in
investigations—that is: (1) how they aid investigations and
prosecutions; (2) what different purposes they may serve; and (3)
to what extent the ever-expanding availability and law enforcement
access to metadata can counterbalance the loss of CALEA-like
mandates for wiretapping capabilities for interception of
communications content. Viewing the IoT as an ever-expanding
array of potential apertures to aid surveillance also requires an
examination of the extent to which such surveillance portals
counterbalance some of the challenges posed to law enforcement
by increasing encryption of communications content.
To be clear, these are not easy questions to answer because, to
date, we have not been framing the underlying inquiry correctly.
The Manhattan DA, for example, cites the fact that, between
September 17, 2014 and October 1, 2015, his office was unable to
execute 111 searches of smartphones running iOS 8. 85 As one
81

See id. at 2.
See id. at 8.
83
See id. at 12–15
84
See id. at 6.
85
Manhattan DA report, supra note 20, at 9.
82
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commenter observes, this example illustrates “the paradox at the
heart of this debate: Because the data in question is encrypted, we
will never know what information has been lost to analysts and
investigators.” 86 What we do not know is how many of these
“failed search” cases, nevertheless, resulted in successful
prosecutions. In other words, how often was encryption the
dispositive issue? If such cases were prosecuted successfully, those
prosecutions would inform the discussion about how encryption by
default on smartphones was actually affecting law enforcement
investigations. Rather than discussing such information, the DA’s
report focuses on the assumption that the “out of reach” data
“would have been relevant to the case[s] [at issue] and to the
investigation of additional crimes or perpetrators.” 87 In order to
better understand what law enforcement needs in the context of a
current and changing technological environment that must
accommodate competing visions of security, “we should stop
looking for ‘evidence’ showing that terrorists and criminals use
encryption and should instead look at the evidence that is available
to analysts and investigators.”88 Only when we begin the complex
task of assessing and analyzing the available information, or the
information that could be available to law enforcement without a
backdoor mandate, can we begin to understand how further to
enable law enforcement investigations.
III.
THE IOT
General Michael Hayden, former director of both the CIA and
NSA, has made strong public statements against mandating
backdoors.89 Like many of the security researchers quoted in this
86

Marshall Erwin, The High Standard of Proof in the Encryption Debate,
JUST SECURITY (Feb. 5, 2016, 9:35 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/29177/
high-standard-proof-encryption-debate/.
87
Manhattan DA Report, supra note 20, at 9.
88
See Erwin, supra note 86.
89
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Former NSA Chief: I ‘Would Not Support’
Encryption Backdoors, VICE MOTHERBOARD, (Oct. 6, 2015, 2:38PM), available
at http://motherboard.vice.com/read/former-nsa-chief-strongly-disagrees-withcurrent-nsa-chief-on-encryption.
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Article, General Hayden believes the security of the United States
is “better served by stronger encryption, rather than baking in
weaker encryption.” 90 But Hayden warns civil libertarians not to
rush to “get his autograph” because, as a former high-level official
in the Intelligence world, he would forego backdoors in favor of
“bulk data and metadata [collection.]”91 While General Hayden’s
intelligence-based perspective 92 provides an important foil to the
FBI Director’s perspective and illustrates what is perhaps a
significant tension between law enforcement and intelligence
community perspectives in the context of the “Going Dark”
debate, 93 he is certainly not the first to recognize the revelatory
nature of metadata. Justice Sotomayor, for example, observes in
her United States v. Jones94 concurrence that aggregated location
data:
[G]enerates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations. See, e.g., People v.
Weaver, 12 N. Y. 3d 433, 441–442, 909 N. E. 2d 1195, 1199 (2009)
(“Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment
center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour
90

Id.
Patrick Howell O’Neill, Former NSA Chief Says U.S. Can Get Around
Encryption with Metadata, Argues Against Backdoors, THE DAILY DOT, (Jan 5,
2016, 10:42 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/michael-hayden-encryptiondebate-clinton-bush. General Hayden has, for example, argued for the necessity
of the bulk collection of American’s domestic calling records under a program
previously authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Court under Section 215 of the
USA Patriot Act. See Hayden-Soghoian Debate: Privacy vs. Intelligence
Collection available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6aRklrv3r34.
92
To be fair, General Hayden acknowledges that in the context of the “Going
Dark” debate, “[e]ncryption is ‘a law enforcement issue more than an
intelligence issue’ [because,]” Hayden argued “frankly intelligence gets to break
all sorts of rules to cheat to use other paths.” Id.
93
See Carrie Cordero, LAWFARE, Is There a National Security-Law
Enforcement Divide on “Going Dark”?, Lawfare (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM)
available at https://lawfareblog.com/there-national-security-law-enforcementdivide-going-dark.
94
United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, (2012).
91
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motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay
bar and on and on”). The Government can store such records and
efficiently mine them for information years into the future. PinedaMoreno, 617 F. 3d, at 1124 (opinion of Kozinski, C. J.).95

The IoT—which “refers to the ability of everyday objects to
connect to the Internet and to send and receive data”96—promises
to augment immeasurably a communications environment already
teeming with metadata that reveals “personal information, habits,
locations and physical conditions over time.”97 Indeed, as the FTC
notes in a January 2015 Staff Report, “experts estimate that, as of
[2015], there will be 25 billion connected devices, and by 2020, 50
billion.”98 The kinds of IoT devices now available to consumers are
already too numerous to list here—and new ones come on the
market every day—but illustrative examples include smart
thermostats, automation systems for home lights and appliances,
and bracelets that track your physical activity.99 Such products are
proliferating to the degree that the Berkman Center Report projects
that the IoT “has the potential fundamentally to shift the way we
interact with our surroundings[:]”100
Appliances and products ranging from televisions and toasters to bed
sheets, light bulbs, cameras, toothbrushes, door locks, cars, watches and
other wearables are being packed with sensors and wireless
connectivity. Numerous companies are developing platforms and
products in these areas. To name but a few, Phillips, GE, Amazon,
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Tesla, Samsung, and Nike are all working
on products with embedded IoT functionality, with sensors ranging
from gyroscopes, accelerometers, magnetometers, proximity sensors,
microphones, speakers, barometers, infrared sensors, fingerprint
readers, and radio frequency antennae with the purpose of sensing,
collecting, storing, and analyzing fine grained information about their
surrounding environments. These devices will all be connected to each
other via the Internet, transmitting telemetry data to their respective
vendors in the cloud for processing.101
95

Id. at 955.
FTC IoT Staff Report, supra note 67.
97
Id. at ii.
98
Id. at i.
99
Id.
100
Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 13.
101
Id.
96

630

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 599

One researcher, Charles Givre, explored and tested the kinds of
information that can be learned about an individual through the IoT
networked devices she uses. 102 Specifically, Givre presented the
results of an experiment designed to document the wealth of
information collected and stored through everyday use. 103 An
abstract of his presentation notes that Givre “approached [the]
experiment like a law enforcement or intelligence investigation,
beginning with a bit of seed knowledge about the target, and built a
profile about the target using the data that was available via these
devices’ APIs 104 and the data they transmit over the Internet.” 105
The IoT devices at issue in Givre’s investigation include a Wink
Hub (a platform that allows control of Internet-connected home
devices from a single screen), a Nest Thermostat, and an
Automatic car dongle.106 Examination of even a small segment of
Givre’s investigation suggests the broad scope of data potentially
available to law enforcement through following the IoT. The
investigation begins with Givre focusing only with the knowledge
that the “target” (the target in this case is Givre) owned a Wink
Hub.107 From this point, Givre was able to determine the target’s
102

Lauren Kirchner, Your Smart Home Knows A Lot About You, PROPUBLICA,
(Oct. 9, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/your-smart-homeknows-a-lot-about-you?google_editors_picks=true.
103
Id.
104
“In the simplest terms APIs are sets of requirements that govern how one
application can talk to another. APIs aren’t at all new whenever you use a
desktop or laptop APIs are what make it possible to move information between
programs, for instance by cutting and pasting a snippet of a LibreOffice
document into an Excel spreadsheet. System-level APIs makes it possible for
applications like LibreOffice to run on top of an OS like Windows in the first
place.” Brian Proffitt, What API’s Are And Why They’re Important, READWRITE,
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://readwrite.com/2013/09/19/api-defined.
105
Charles Givre, Booze Allen Hamilton, What Does Your Smart Device Know
About You? STRATA + HARDOOP (Sept. 30, 2015), http://conferences.oreilly.com/
strata/big-data-conference-ny-2015/public/schedule/detail/42710.
106
Charles S. Givre, Booz Allen Hamilton, Presentation at Strata NYC 2015,
What Does Your Smart Device Know About You?, available at
http://cdn.oreillystatic.com/en/assets/1/event/132/What%20does%20your%20sm
art%20device%20know%20about%20you_%20%20%20Presentation.pdf.
107
Id. at slide 5.
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Facebook ID and Twitter handle, and to identify the other devices
owned or controlled by the target, which included a Nest
Thermostat. 108 From the Nest Thermostat, Givre learned that the
target uses Comcast for Internet service, that the target lives in
Pikesville, Maryland and owns both an iPhone and iPad.109
Although access to the data produced by these devices is
typically protected by an email address and password, 110 Givre
notes that the devices store data on remote cloud servers, rather
than locally.111 Remote cloud storage often gives law enforcement
the ability to obtain data, since it is held by and accessible to a
third party provider to whom law enforcement need only present
an appropriate court order. While there may be no mandates to
require retention of the data, having access to it is often part of a
company’s revenue stream and product functionality.112 If Givre’s
investigation were an actual one performed by law enforcement,
the identification of these various accounts could provide a range
of information about the target, including his interests and
associates (via Twitter) and his likely comings and goings from the
home (via Nest).113
Again, this discussion only highlights a small selection of IoT
networked devices that may operate in a target’s life and references
only some of the kinds of data they could provide to law
enforcement. What is particularly important about Givre’s work
for law enforcement (and what may already be part of law
enforcement investigative practices) is his illustration of how it is
108

Id. at slide 22.
Id. at slide 41.
110
Id.at slide 9.
111
Id. at slide 7.
112
Consider, for example, that the iCloud backup service is enabled by default
on Apple devices (the automatic backup can, of course, be disabled by users).
Although Apple encrypts iCloud backup services, it holds the keys. Law
enforcement can, therefore, compel Apple to turn over data stored in the iCloud
with the appropriate court order, generally a warrant. The Berkman Center
Report also notes that “the majority of businesses that provide communication
services rely on access to user data for revenue streams and product
functionality should a password be forgotten.” Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 3.
113
Givre, supra note 105, at slides 43–48.
109
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possible to start with a single bit of information about a networked
device used by a target, then build a profile about the target’s
broader use of networked devices, which can lead to relevant
information for an investigation. Following this meticulous
investigative path—following the IoT—enables law enforcement to
design individualized investigative plans for targets based on the
kinds of devices they use and the kinds of metadata or public
source content (think Twitter and Facebook)114 such devices and
services reveal.
It should also be noted that Givre performed his investigation
without any “privileged access”—that is, without the ability to
compel information from ISPs in order to determine what devices
are present in the home and calling back to the manufacturer. Law
enforcement could, however, compel such information from, for
example, Comcast or Verizon.115
In addition to the public source content that may be revealed
through following the IoT, the IoT provides a range of apertures
that may allow law enforcement to record private conversations or
view activities occurring in private spaces. These surveillance
“opportunities” can generally be categorized in two different ways,
the first of which is company assistance. As noted in the Berkman
Center Report, “[t]he audio and video sensors on IoT devices will
open up numerous avenues for government actors to demand
access to real-time and recorded communications.” 116 In other
words, law enforcement may be able to compel assistance from
companies whose products are capable of recording conversations
or activity, “whether through one’s own smartphone, an Amazon
Echo, a baby monitor, an Internet-enabled security camera, or a
futuristic ‘Elf on a Shelf’ laden with networked audio and image
sensors.”117
114

Of course, law enforcement may not need IoT information to find a target’s
public Twitter or Facebook account.
115
See Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access (SCA),18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2010); Pen Registers and Trap
and Trace Devices (Pen/Trap), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2010).
116
Don’t Panic, supra note 63, at 13.
117
Id. at 13–14.
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As noted in the Berkman Center Report, there is some legal
support for this kind of compelled company assistance.
Specifically, in The Company v. United States,118 the FBI, under
Wiretap Act authority for “bugging” individuals suspected of
criminal activity, sought to compel the Company to use its onboard driver assistance technology to record conversations going
on inside a car. 119 One feature of the technology allows the
Company to open “a cellular connection to a vehicle and listen to
oral communications within the car” as part of the stolen vehicle
recovery mode.120 When the system is in stolen recovery vehicle
mode, however, passengers in the car cannot use any of the other
“on board” system services—they are completely disabled. 121 If,
for example, the customer presses an emergency button while the
recovery mode is enabled, the customer will not be connected to
the response center—only the FBI will be listening in on the
line.122 Ultimately, the court did not order the Company to assist
the FBI because such compelled assistance violated the “minimum
of interference” language of the Wiretap Act.123 While the court
found that the “minimum of interference” requirement allows for
“some level of interference with customers’ service in the
conducting of surveillance,” such “eavesdropping is not performed
with ‘a minimum of interference’ if a service is completely shut
down as a result of the surveillance.”124 While this case was not
decided in the government’s favor, other kinds of IoT companycompelled assistance may be upheld, as long as the surveillance

118

The Company v. United States, 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1133.
120
Id. at 1133–34.
121
Id. at 1134, 1145.
122
Id. at 1135.
123
Id. at 1145 (“Our interpretation of the minimum of interference language is
bolstered by our reading of title III which we believe does not evince a
congressional intent to authorize surveillance in the face of complete disruption
of a wire and electronic communication service for a particular customer.”).
124
The Company, 349 F.3d at 1145 (emphasis in original).
119
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would not completely disable the intended use of the product or
service.125
Second, IoT networked devices can provide apertures for
hacking (assuming such hacking is lawful), 126 where law
enforcement would enable audio or video features of a networked
device or use one device to obtain access to the target’s network or
user credentials, potentially facilitating the collection of
information from a user’s computer or other networked device. In
recent written congressional testimony, the Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper, explained that:
“Smart” devices incorporated into the electric grid, vehicles—including
autonomous vehicles—and household appliances are improving
efficiency, energy conservation, and convenience. However, security
industry analysts have demonstrated that many of these new systems
can threaten data privacy, data integrity, or continuity of services, in the
future, intelligence services might use the IoT for identification,
surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for
recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.127

Former CIA Director, David Petraeus, echoed this same
message earlier in 2012, explaining that:
Items of interest will be located, identified, monitored, and remotely
controlled through technologies such as radio-frequency identification,
sensor networks, tiny embedded servers, and energy harvesters — all
connected to the next-generation internet using abundant, low-cost, and
high-power computing.128

125

Id. (“We need not decide precisely how much interference is permitted. A
minimum of at least precludes total incapacitation of a service while interception
is in progress.”).
126
See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63; see also infra note
130.
127
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community:
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 114th Cong. 1 (2016)
(statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence),
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats-hearing.
128
Spencer Ackerman, CIA Chief: We’ll Spy on You Through Your
Dishwasher,
WIRED,
(Mar.
15,
2012,
5:35
PM)
http://www.wired.com/2012/03/petraeus-tv-remote.
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Moreover, a researcher looking at IoT security from a military
perspective characterizes IoT as “a new attack surface.”129 While
these are Intelligence Community and Military perspectives, some
such capabilities are not per se outside the reach of all law
enforcement, as long as they are appropriately authorized,
resourced, and overseen. 130 Indeed, a group of distinguished

129

KONRAD WRONA, SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS: A MILITARY
PERSPECTIVE 503 (IEEE, 2015) Specifically, the attack surface consists of: “IoT
devices (i.e. sensors and actuators),” “Communication channels between the
devices as well as between the devices and the back-end system,” “IoT-specific
back-end applications,” and “Back-end data storage.” Id.
130
See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63. There are a number
of law enforcement hacking activities (often referred to as Network Investigative
Techniques) that are becoming public, with at least one dating back thirteen
years. See Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Used Hacking Software Decade Before iPhone
Fight, New York Times (April 13, 2016) http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/04/
14/technology/fbi-tried-to-defeat-encryption-10-years-ago-files-show.html?_r=2.
In early 2003, FBI agents hit a roadblock in an investigation called Operation
Trail Mix. Id. While agents had been intercepting phone calls and emails of their
targets, encryption software suddenly made the emails unreadable. Id. The
investigators, in what is believed to be first example of the FBI “remotely
installing surveillance software, known as spyware or malware, as part of a
criminal wiretap” convinced a judge to let them “remotely and secretly” install
the malware on the targets’ computers to help agents thwart the encryption. Id.
“‘This was the first time that the Department of Justice had ever approved such
an intercept of this type,’ an FBI agent wrote in a 2005 document summing up
the case.” Id.
Other, more recent examples of law enforcement hacking include: In the
Matter of the Search of Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”) for Email
Address texan.slayer@yahoo.com, Third Amended Application For A Search
Warrant (Case No. 12-sw-05685-KTM) (US Dist. Ct., D. of Colorado) (Dec. 11,
2012) (“[T]he NIT is designed to collect the items described in Attachment B –
i.e., information that may assist in identifying the computer, its location, other
information about the computer, and the user of the computer, all of which is
evidence of violations of Section 1038 of Title 18, United States Code (False
information and hoaxes.”). Id. at 16; In Re Warrant to Search A Target
Computer At Premises, Memorandum and Order (Case. No. H-13-234M) (US
Dist. Ct. Southern Dist. Of Texas, Houston Division) (April 22, 2013) (“The
search would be accomplished by surreptitiously installing software designed
not only to extract certain stored electronic records but also to generate user
photographs and location information over a 30-day period. In other words, the
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computer scientists have identified a need to develop a “lawful
hacking” legal framework that could support law enforcement
exploitation of existing vulnerabilities in software and mobile
devices, which the authors maintain is a more secure alternative to
the purposeful introduction of backdoors into our networks and
mobile devices.131
Part IV will look at how the IRA case might be investigated in
2016, with a particular focus on capabilities and information that
may be available from exploitation of networked IoT devices.
IV.
BRINGING THE IRA INVESTIGATION FORWARD IN TIME:
WHAT KIND OF CAPABILITIES AND INFORMATION WOULD BE
AVAILABLE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT NOW?
Through a reasonable exercise of the imagination, it is possible
to envision how the IRA investigation might proceed in 2016’s
technological environment. The purpose of this exercise is to
illustrate at least some of the current investigative capabilities and
information types available to analysts and investigators, in order
to compare and contrast them with the tools available during the
actual investigation and thus begin to assess what law enforcement
actually needs in a post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption
era. This single case cannot offer a comprehensive analysis on the
subject. Indeed, an ongoing, rigorous case-by-case analysis is
needed with law enforcement providing: (1) information about
failures to obtain evidence due to an inability to acquire IP-based
communications data (in motion or stored on a mobile), which
consequently prevented the pursuit of a successful investigation
and prosecution; and (2) information about failures to obtain
evidence due to an inability to acquire IP-based communications
data (in motion or stored on a mobile device) that, nevertheless,
result in a successful investigation and prosecution. In other words,
we need continually to assess what is available, what is missing,
and how the inability to access information in a timely fashion is
Government seeks a warrant to hack a computer suspected of criminal use. For
various reasons explained below, the application is denied.”). Id. at 1.
131
Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63.
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affecting law enforcement investigations. With this kind of
information in hand, policy makers would be in a much better
position to determine what kinds of new capabilities law
enforcement actually needs and what new statutory authorities are
necessary for law enforcement to employ those capabilities. Part of
this analysis must include an examination of the differing functions
metadata and content 132 may serve in an investigation and
prosecution and the speed at which such information may or may
not be available to law enforcement in the current technological
environment.
The condensed narrative of the IRA investigation presented in
the Introduction can, more or less, be outlined in the following
way:
(1) An ongoing weapons smuggling operation was discovered.
In addition to stopping the flow of weapons, law enforcement
needed to determine both who was part of the operation and the
intended use or purpose for the acquired weapons.133
(2) Answering these questions began with tracing the first gun
back to a gun dealer in South Florida, which identified a female
gun purchaser. 134 Express Mail information on the recovered
packages led agents back to the particular post offices in South
Florida where some of the mailings occurred, and video of the
mailings and express mail records kept by the Post Offices helped
agents identify two men who mailed packages.135
132

For purposes of this discussion, content is being defined per the definition
found in the Wiretap Act: “‘contents’, when used with respect to any wire, oral
or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8)
(2004). I have argued elsewhere that the content/non-content distinction as
defined the in the Wiretap Act and the Pen/Trap statute is no longer a viable,
workable distinction in an IP-based communications environment. See Steven
M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Susan Landau, & Stephanie K. Pell, It’s Too
Complicated: The Technological Implications of IP-based Communications on
Content/ Non-Content Distinctions and the Third Party Doctrine, (forthcoming)
HARV. J. L. & TECH. (2016).
133
See United States v. Claxton, supra note 1.
134
Id.
135
Id.
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(3) Physical surveillance of these identified suspects led to the
identification of an additional male suspect.136 Through discovery
of locations where more weapons were purchased, it was
determined that the male suspect had also purchased some of the
weapons.137
(4) While others associated with the original four suspects were
identified in the course of the investigation, no one else was
indicted, save one gun dealer who had falsified federal forms
required to sell the weapons to the female and male gun
purchasers. 138 Moreover, the means of identification of potential
co-conspirators was limited mostly to physical surveillance and the
examination of various kinds of records associated with the gun
purchases, the mailing of the packages, and financial accounts
where deposits were made to fund the gun smuggling operation.139
(5) While investigators had suspicions that the gun running
operation might be tied to IRA activities, 140 the purpose of the
operation and the defendants’ intentions for the weapons were not
known until the defendants were arrested and the lead defendant
told agents that this was an IRA operation and that the weapons
were meant to kill British police and Protestant paramilitary
forces.141 The lead defendant also indicated that the peace process
had failed and the weapons were meant to replace the cache of
weapons being publicly turned over as part of the Good Friday
Agreements. 142 Various documents and other physical items
retrieved in post-arrest searches of places where the defendants
lived corroborated the statements made by the lead defendant.143
These statements were necessary evidence for the purpose of
136
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proving the most serious charge lodged in the case, a conspiracy to
murder or maim persons in a foreign country in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 956(a)(1). 144 Additional weapons, some that were
packaged and ready to be mailed, were also discovered in the postarrest searches of homes.145
By taking this case forward in time to the technological
environment of 2016, which requires some reasonable speculation
and imagination, it is possible to envision how metadata and
content would assist investigators. Once the first weapon was
discovered at Coventry Airport, the three critical challenges were:
(1) finding and/or intercepting all additional weapons that were
part of the operation; (2) identifying all of the individuals involved
in the operation; and (3) determining the purpose of the operation.
It would be fair to characterize the defendants as practicing
relatively good operational security (“OPSEC”) for 1999. While
investigators discovered that some of the defendants had cell
phones, the phones did not provide useful information during the
course of the investigation—indeed, one subject evaded physical
surveillance on the day of arrest and traveled north, only to be
located later in Philadelphia.146 Additional co-conspirators were not
located through cell phone usage and, to our knowledge, the
defendants did not communicate over the phone.147 As far as we
could tell, per actual physical surveillance, communication
occurred during in person meetings at bars, gas stations, and inside
of defendants’ apartments.148
In 2016, however, it is a bit harder to “stay off the grid.” The
use of cell phone location data, whether through real-time tracking,
historical records, cell-tower dumps, or community of interest
requests,149 which can reveal previously unknown associations by
144
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showing phones that “occupied” the same places at the same
time,150 are now available to law enforcement. Assuming the 2016
suspects 151 are carrying mobile devices, it arguably would be
quicker and more efficient today to identify their associates and
possible co-conspirators than it was in 1999. As previously noted,
the IRA case was an ongoing operation when discovered, and only
the four defendants were arrested and prosecuted for purchasing
and shipping the weapons overseas.152
Let’s assume, as was true in 1999, that the suspects do not
communicate using unencrypted voice communication channels.
More specifically, let’s assume, according to current tradecraft,
that when they do communicate using a smartphone, they use an
App for sending end-to-end encrypted texts or making encrypted
calls. The content of those communications is, therefore, not
available to law enforcement through the traditional means either
of serving a provider with a warrant for stored communications or
a Title III Wiretap order for intercepting the communications in
real-time. Law enforcement, however, needs to know the purpose
of the smuggling operation, since it would assist in determining
who may be in danger, as well as provide important evidence of
intent, which goes towards proving that the suspects are conspiring
to murder or maim individuals in a foreign country. The metadata
from cell phones or other mobile or wearable devices is unlikely to
reveal that kind of information. As previously referenced, it is
more likely to assist in finding and tracking a suspect, learning
about the patterns of his daily life and mapping out his web of
associates. 153 In the actual IRA case, the content evidence
necessary to reveal the purpose of the smuggling operation and that
the defendants were part of a conspiracy to murder or maim
Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 117, 119–33, 152–53 (2012).
150
Pell & Soghoian, supra note 149, at 152–53.
151
The term “suspect” is used when talking about a 2016 re-visioning of the
IRA case and “defendant” is used when talking about the defendants in the
actual IRA case in 1999–2000.
152
See United States v. Claxton, supra note 1.
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See U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955.
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individuals in a foreign country did not come until after the
defendants were arrested and the lead defendant gave a confession
to the FBI case agent. As is often the case in an investigation, there
are no guarantees of “forthcoming” evidence—you work an
investigation and use the lawful resources available to you, some
of which involve good interviewing skills.
Still, in today’s environment, law enforcement is right to be
concerned that communications content, which can be critical to
the successful investigative and prosecutorial elements of a case,
(including the ability to stop an attack before it happens), is
becoming increasingly unavailable through the traditional means
of compelling the information from a third party with the
appropriate court order. One method to gain access to encrypted
communications associated with smartphones is to hack the phones
of targets, infecting them with malware capable of capturing voice
communications and keystrokes before they are encrypted. 154
Moreover, the IoT is providing new kinds of apertures that could
facilitate the sound and video recording of communications and
activities occurring in private spaces, whether via company
assistance or through hacking by the police. Determining what
apertures may be available and exploitable based on the kind of
IoT devices enabled in a home or office could, in some cases, be a
time-intensive process. Accordingly, while communications may
be accessible, such access may not be as readily available as in a
CALEA-like framework. Given that the defendants were not
talking on phones in the IRA case, it would have been worth
considering how IoT devices could have been exploited in their
apartments or the cars they drove, had such technology only been
available in 1999. Of course, bugging a room is not a new
technique, but it generally requires direct physical access to the
room, often through surreptitious means. Direct physical access is
risky, both in terms of physical risk to the agents and the risk of
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compromising the investigation, 155 which presumably limits the
regularity156 and efficacy of the technique.
With the IoT, however, such “bugging,” whether to record
sound or video, is not limited by physical access, nor is it
necessarily burdened due to the risk of discovery or harm to the
officers. Moreover, unlike the traditional wiretapping of phones,
recording the sounds and sights going on inside the home has the
potential to reveal a broader array of sensitive, personal
information, some of which could also be highly relevant to an
investigation.
In the IRA case, all defendants were convicted of a series of
charges relating to the gun smuggling operation.157 None, however,
was convicted of the most serious charge of conspiring to murder
or maim individuals in a foreign country—even though the lead
defendant’s post-arrest statements were admitted in the trial
without any limiting instructions regarding their applicability to the
other defendants.158 Sometimes, no matter how strong the evidence
is, juries do not convict.
V.
CONCLUSION
The FBI Director and Manhattan DA raise legitimate concerns
about how a post-CALEA, cybersecurity-centric encryption era
will affect law enforcement’s ability to carry out its traditional
public safety mission. This Article takes the position that mandated
backdoors are not a viable option for enabling law enforcement
access to communications data because the attendant cybersecurity
risks are too great. As policy makers grapple with these competing
155
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visions of security, they must determine what law enforcement
actually needs in the current technological environment. The IoT
will augment immeasurably the variety and amount of revelatory
metadata, which can assist law enforcement in myriad ways, from
locating and tracking a target, to identifying his associates and
discerning the routines and patterns of activity in his life. With
respect to communications content, the IoT offers new apertures
for audio and video recording of communications and activities
inside public spaces.
As policy makers consider what law enforcement actually
needs and what, if any, changes to the law are required for law
enforcement to execute certain functions effectively, the pubic
discussion must also account for the privacy implications of,
among other things, the smart-sensored home. An IoT-enabled
home, office, or other private space offers law enforcement the
ability to enter the home and record conversations and activities in
ways that were not possible in the past, save for the relatively
infrequent installation of a bugging device, which required
physical access to the home. Perhaps a useful counterbalance to
law enforcement’s challenges in the current technological
environment, the smart home is a potentially bountiful surveillance
platform. Some yet uncreated avatar of the popular child’s toy “Elf
on the Shelf” 159 or its Jewish equivalent, the “Mensch on a
Bench,”160 may ultimately become a “Snoop on the Stoop” invited
to sit in our homes with a seemingly benign doll’s smile, sporting
one of many new sets of IoT eyes and ears.
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